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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly hold that the statute of limitations had run 
on Mr. Roth's claims? 
Preservation: This was the main issue presented to the trial court by 
Dr. Pedersen's motion for judgment on the pleadings. (R. 15-24.) 
Standard of Review: "The applicability of a statute of limitations and the 
applicability of the discovery rule are questions of law, which we review for 
correctness." Russell Packard Development, Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14,1118, 108 
P.3d741, 745. 
2. Did the trial court properly rule that Mr. Roth's Complaint failed to 
plead a claim of fraudulent concealment? 
Preservation: This issue was preserved by Mr. Roth's opposition 
memorandum. (R. 54-56.) 
Standard of Review: 
A court may enter judgment on the pleadings when the moving 
party is entitled to judgment on the face of the pleadings 
themselves. A reviewing court will affirm a judgment on the 
pleadings only if, as a matter of law, the nonmoving party could 
not prevail under the facts alleged. Therefore, this court gives 
such a ruling no deference ana reviews it for correctness. On 
appeal from the grant of a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, this court takes the factual allegations of the 
nonmoving party as true, considering such facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable 
to the non-moving party. 
1 
MBNA America Bank. N.A. v. Williams, 2006 UT App 432,11 2, 147 P.3d 536, 
537. 
PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTION. STATUTES. 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-404(l) and (2): 
(1) A malpractice action against a health care provider shall be 
commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient 
discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have 
discovered the injury, whichever first occurs, but not to exceed 
four years after tne date of the alleged act, omission, neglect, or 
occurrence. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1): 
(a) in an action where the allegation against the health care 
provider is that a foreign object has been wrongfully left within a 
patient's body, the claim shall be barred unless commenced 
within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through 
the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the 
existence of the foreign object wrongfully left in the patient's 
body, whichever first occurs; or 
(b) in an action where it is alleged that a patient has been 
prevented from discovering misconduct on the part of a health 
care provider because that nealth care provider has affirmatively 
acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct, the claim 
shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the 
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable 
diligence, should have discovered the fraudulent concealment, 
whichever first occurs. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
On May 24, 2004, general surgeon Hugh Voorhees, M.D. ("Dr. Voorhees53), 
was operating on Plaintiff/Appellant Larry Roth (ccMr. Roth55), to remove a portion 
of his colon, which had been marked by ink tattoos during an earlier polypectomy 
performed by Ronald Joseph, M.D. ("Dr. Joseph55). During the surgery, Dr. 
Voorhees asked Appellee Peder J. Pedersen, M.D. ("Dr. Pedersen55) to consult in a 
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failed attempt to identify the tattooed area. Prior to asking Dr. Pedersen to assist in 
attempting to identify the tattoos, Dr. Voorhees had already removed the portion of 
Mr. Roth's colon based upon an area described in Dr. Joseph's chart. 
After his surgery, Dr. Voorhees advised Mr. Roth that neither he nor 
Dr. Pedersen could identify the tattooed area. Dr. Voorhees told Mr. Roth, 
however, that he had removed the correct portion of the colon. During a 
subsequent colonoscopy on October 13, 2004, however, Dr. Joseph saw the tattoos, 
told Mr. Roth that a portion of his colon that was to have been removed was not 
and referred Mr. Roth to another physician. On November 8, 2004, another 
colonoscopy was performed by Jason Willis, M.D. (ccDr. Willis55)who also saw the 
tattoos. On January 24, 2005, a second surgery was performed to remove the 
portion of Mr. Roth5s bowel that had been designated for removal on May 24, 
2004. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On May 24, 2006, Mr. Roth initiated an arbitration action by service of a 
notice of claim against Dr. Voorhees for malpractice. Dr. Pedersen was not named 
as a Defendant. (R. 44-45.) The claims against Dr. Voorhees were resolved in 
favor of Dr. Voorhees through an arbitration hearing held on August 22, 2007. 
(R. 30.) On January 12, 2008, nearly four years after the surgery and almost two 
years after commencing action against Dr. Voorhees, Mr. Roth served a Notice to 
Commence Legal Action against Dr. Pedersen. (R. 30.) Following completion of 
the pre-litigation process, Mr. Roth commenced legal action by filing a Complaint 
on August 21, 2008. (R. 1-10.) 
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Dr. Pedersen filed an Answer accompanied by a Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings on the grounds that Mr. Roth's claims were barred by the medical 
malpractice statute of limitations. (R. 11-14.) On December 23, 2008, the trial 
court ruled in favor of Dr. Pedersen, holding that Mr. Roth's claims were time-
barred. (R. 70-71.) Mr. Roth filed his Notice of Appeal on January 21, 2009. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Dr. Joseph performed a colonoscopy on Mr. Roth on April 28, 2004, during 
which he removed a polyp from Mr. Roth's colon. (R. 2.) After the colonoscopy, 
Dr. Joseph advised Mr. Roth that he had placed tattooed markings ccabove and 
below the site from which he had removed the polyp and told Mr. Roth that, 
because the polyp was cancerous, he should have the area of his colon between the 
tattoos removed. (R.3.) On May 24, 2004, Dr. Voorhees operated to remove the 
infected portion of Mr. Roth's colon. (R. 3.) During the surgery, Dr. Voorhees 
was unable to locate the tattoos placed by Dr. Joseph. (R. 3.) Dr. Voorhees 
contacted Dr. Pedersen, who was on call for Dr. Joseph, to see if he could help 
identify the tattoos. (R. 3.) Before Dr. Pedersen arrived, Dr. Voorhees had 
removed 25 cm of Mr. Roth's distal sigmoid colon. (R. 3.) Dr. Pedersen looked for 
the tattoos, but was unable to locate them. (R. 3.) Dr. Voorhees told Mr. Roth 
after the May 24, 2004, surgery that neither he nor Dr. Pedersen could see the 
tattoos, but that he believed he had removed the correct portion of the colon based 
on Dr. Joseph's Operative Report describing the area that needed to be removed. 
The post-surgical conversation between Dr. Voorhees and Mr. Roth is 
documented in Dr Voorhees3 office note of June 8, 2004, and in a letter he wrote 
the same day to Dr. Joseph. (R. 28; See also Appellant's Brief p. 22 conceding that 
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ccRoth was in fact after the surgery misinformed by Dr. Voorhees that he and 
Dr. Pedersen removed the cancerous site from Roth's colon." (emphasis added)). 
On October 13, 2004, Dr. Joseph performed a follow-up colonoscopy. His 
report described some faint ink marks in the mucosa of Mr. Roth's colon. (R. 28, 
Complaint 11 37, R. 6.) Dr. Joseph referred Mr. Roth to Randall Burt, M.D. 
(ccDr. Burt"), at the University of Utah. On November 8, 2004, Dr. Burt, assisted 
by Dr. Willis, performed a flexible sigmoidoscopy, in which they observed two 
tattoos. (R. 28, 37-39.) Dr. Burt discussed the findings of the procedure with 
Mr. Roth and recommended a second surgery to remove the portion of the colon 
delineated by the tattoo marks. (R. 29, 41-42.) Dr. Burt referred Mr. Roth to Brad 
Sklow, M.D. ("Dr. Sklow"), a colorectal surgeon at the University of Utah. (Id.) 
Dr. Sklow performed a second bowel resection on Mr. Roth on January 24, 2005. 
(R. 6, 29.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Roth knew in May of 2004, as he concedes in his Brief at p. 22, that 
Dr. Pedersen consulted with Dr. Voorhees during Mr. Roth's colon surgery. On 
October 13, 2004, as alleged in the Complaint, Dr. Joseph advised Mr. Roth that 
Dr. Voorhees had failed to remove the portion of his infected colon delineated by 
the tattoos. At that time, Mr. Roth knew, or should have known, that his surgery 
was not successful and that the failure was possibly due to negligence of both 
Dr. Voorhees and Dr. Pedersen in failing to see the tattoos. Under Utah law, 
Mr. Roth's action against Dr. Pedersen accrued on October 13, 2004. In order to 
do so timely, Mr. Roth needed to bring a claim against Dr. Pedersen by October 14, 
2006. His Notice of Intent to Commence Action, however, was not served until 
5 
January 12, 2008. The trial court correctly dismissed Mr. Roth's action as time-
barred. 
Mr. Roth attempts to avoid the obvious untimeliness of his action against 
Dr. Pedersen by alleging fraudulent concealment. The fraudulent concealment 
allegation fails in this case, however, for several reasons. First, once the cause of 
action accrued, i.e., when Mr. Roth discovered or through the use of reasonable 
diligence should have discovered an injury which is not an accepted result of Dr. 
Voorhees3 surgical procedure, the fraudulent concealment tolling provisions of the 
Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act did not apply. Mr. Roth knew that the portion of 
his colon delineated by Dr. Joseph's tattooing had not been removed when Dr. 
Joseph told him so on October 13, 2004. Indeed, that is why Mr. Roth served Dr. 
Voorhees with a Notice of Intent to Commence Action in May of 2006. Mr. Roth 
had all the information needed to file a claim against Dr. Pedersen at the same time 
he had the information to file his claim against Dr. Voorhees. 
Second, Mr. Roth failed to adequately plead fraudulent concealment under 
Rule 9(b), Utah R.Civ.P., which requires that fraud be plead with particularity. 
Indeed, Mr. Roth does not plead that Dr. Pedersen had a duty of disclosure to him 
that he failed to perform. Rather, Mr. Roth alleges only that ccit appears55 that 
Dr. Pedersen failed to advise Dr. Voorhees of problems that Dr. Joseph was having 
with fading ink. Central to the concealment claim is the issue of how Mr. Roth 
could rely on an alleged failure to communicate to Dr. Voorhees the possibility of 
fading ink once he knew the ink marks had been seen by subsequent practitioners on 
October 13, 2004. 
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Third, Mr. Roth makes no allegation of an affirmative act of fraudulent 
concealment as required by statute. Mr. Roth does not allege in his Complaint, nor 
does he argue in his Appellate Brief, that Dr. Pedersen did anything more than fail to 
tell Dr. Voorhees that Dr. Joseph had expressed to him problems with fading ink. 
Additionally, Mr. Roth fails to establish any duty that Dr. Pedersen had to discuss a 
hypothetical fading ink issue with him. As a matter of law, Dr. Pedersen's silence 
cannot equate to an affirmative act of fraudulent concealment. 
The statute of limitations issues were presented to the trial court pursuant to a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings. Mr. Roth complains that the Court used 
facts provided in the Answer as a basis for its ruling, apparently arguing that only the 
allegations of Plaintiffs Complaint could be judged by the Court in ruling on a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings. However, Rule 12(c) contemplates the 
potential for a judgment on the pleadings (plural) as distinguished from a motion to 
dismiss based upon the sole pleading of a complaint. Moreover, none of the facts 
presented by Dr. Pedersen's Answer contradict the allegations of Mr. Roth's 
Complaint. Rather, the Answer merely fills in some additional, uncontroverted 
details of the medical care omitted from the Complaint, particularly those relating to 
the statute of limitations issue. It was appropriate for the trial court to rely on the 
facts set forth in the Answer, especially in light of the fact that Mr. Roth did not 
contest the accuracy of the additional facts provided by the Answer. Moreover, the 
relevant facts relating to the discovery of injury are conceded by Mr. Roth's. He 
acknowledges in his Complaint is conceded in Mr. Roth. He acknowledges in his 
brief on appeal that he knew of Dr. Pedersen's involvement in the Voorhees3 surgery, 
knew of the inability of both Dr. Voorhees and Dr. Pedersen to observe the 
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tattooing and knew on October 13, 2004 that the tattoos placed by Dr. Joseph were 
still present after Dr. Voorhees5 surgery. 
Mr. Roth could have initiated legal action against Dr. Pedersen at the time he 
did so against Dr. Voorhees. Instead, he chose to attempt to initiate legal action 
against Dr. Pedersen only after he failed to prevail on his claim against 
Dr. Voorhees, *.£., when Mr. Roth discovered his injury on October 13, 2004. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED INFORMATION 
PRESENTED IN DR. PEDERSEN'S ANSWER AS PART OF THE 
"PLEADINGS.55 
A. MR. ROTH HAS FAILED TO PRESERVE THIS ISSUE FOR 
APPEAL. 
Despite his claim to the contrary, Mr. Roth fails to cite to any part of the 
record where he preserved the argument that the trial court erroneously considered 
Dr. Pedersen's Answer in ruling on the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. It is 
well-established that a party may not raise a substantive issue for the first time upon 
appeal. Kg,, Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 767 (Utah 1987). 
Centennial Inv. Co.. LLC v. Nuttall, 2007 UT App. 321,11 26, n. 7, 171 P.3d 458, 
464 (declining to address part of attorney fee question not preserved for appeal). 
This Court has explained what steps are necessary for preserving a substantive 
issue for appeal. 
To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must timely 
bring the issue to the attention of the trial court, thus providing 
the court an opportunity to rule on the issue's merits. Issues not 
raised in the trial court in timely fashion are deemed waived, 
precluding the appellate court from considering their merits on 
appeal. Second, the issue must be specifically raised such that the 
issue is sufficientiy raised to a level of consciousness before the 
trial court. Third, the party must introduce to the trial court 
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supporting evidence or relevant legal authority to support its 
argument. 
Hart v. Salt Lake County Commission. 945 P.2d 125, 129-30 (Utah App. 1997) 
(punctuation, citations omitted). The Hart court noted that merely mentioning an 
issue in the pleadings or raising an issue in post-trial motions does not preserve the 
issue for appeal. Id Further, even if a post-trial motion raised the issue, where the 
court did not rule on the issue and the party did not point out to the court its failure 
to rule, the issue is not preserved for appeal. Id. 
ccWhen issues are not brought to the trial court's attention in a timely manner, 
they are deemed waived, precluding [the appellate] court from considering their 
merits on appeal.53 Holmstrom v. C.R. England, Inc., 2000 UT App 239,1f 25, 8 
P.3d 281, 288 (punctuation, citation omitted). Nowhere in Mr. Roth's opposition 
memorandum or anywhere else in the trial court record is there an argument that the 
trial court might be considering matters beyond the allegations of the Complaint or 
that doing so would be improper. Additionally, Mr. Roth never controverted the 
allegations of the Answer or moved to have the Court treat Dr. Pedersen's motion as 
one for summary judgment under Rule 56. As a consequence, Mr. Roth has waived 
the argument. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT CONSIDER ISSUES 
OUTSIDE OF THE PLEADINGS. 
Mr. Roth complains that the trial court relied on facts set forth in 
Dr. Pedersen's Answer rather than focusing solely upon allegations of his Complaint. 
In doing so, however, he ignores the fact that Rule 12(c) provides for a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings. It goes without saying, however, that an answer is a 
pleading. Kg,, Turville v. T & T Properties, L.C., 2006 UT App 305, H 27, 145 P.3d 
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1146, 1151 (answer constitutes a responsive pleading); Rule 7(a), Utah R.Civ.P. 
(defining "pleadings" as the complaint, answer and other initial filings). 
What is also significant is that Dr. Pedersen's Answer did not contradict any 
facts alleged in Mr. Roth's Complaint. The Answer merely provides additional facts, 
which Mr. Roth never sought to controvert, material to the statute of limitations 
issue. Adopting Mr. Roth's construction of a motion for judgment on the pleadings 
would mean that a court would have to treat a Rule 12(c) motion as one based only 
on a single pleading, the complaint, rather than both the complaint and answer. 
Doing so would make Rule 12(c) a nullity. 
To constitute matters "outside the pleadings,55 the information considered by 
the trial court would have to include documentation or evidence submitted with a 
memorandum as opposed to information specifically set forth in the answer. E.g., 
Tuttle v. Olds. 2007 UT App 10,1111 8-9, 155 P.3d 893, 896 (holding that federal 
judgment attached to memorandum and not included in an answer was information 
"outside the pleadings.55) 
Mr. Roth had the opportunity to rebut the facts presented by the Answer and 
have the motion treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. He did not 
because the facts are incontrovertible. For purposes of a judgment on the pleadings, 
the trial court appropriately considered the ^incontroverted facts presented by the 
Answer. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT MR, 
ROTH'S CLAIMS AGAINST DR. PEDERSEN ARE BARRED BY 
THE RUNNING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
Mr. Roth concedes that Dr. Voorhees told him of Dr. Pedersen5s consultation 
during his surgery on or near May 24, 2004. Mr. Roth admits he knew on October 
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13, 2004, as a result of the follow-up colonoscopy by Dr. Joseph, that the tattoo 
marks still remained in his colon and that a second surgery would be required. 
(Complaint 11 37, R. 5-6.) Those two bits of knowledge are sufficient under Utah 
law for Mr. Roth's action against Dr. Pedersen to have accrued on October 13, 
2004. 
The statutory language is clear about when a cause of action for medical 
negligence must be instituted: 
A malpractice action against a health care provider shall be 
commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient 
discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have 
discovered the injury, whichever first occurs, but not to exceed 
four years after tne date of the alleged act, omission, neglect, or 
occurrence. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-404(l).1 
Under Utah law, the statute of limitations begins to run when a patient knows 
or should know that he has suffered a legal injury. Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 
147 (Utah 1979). Mr. Roth is correct in stating that cclegal injury" involves both 
discovery of the injury and the negligence causing the injury. (Aplt's Brf p. 17, 
citing Foil.) He ignores, however, subsequent Utah case law which deals with the 
issue of discovery of legal injury. Where it is clear that an unexpected outcome 
resulted from an identifiable medical incident, a patient should know that legal injury 
was suffered at the time of the medical event. Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93, 100 
(Utah 1982 (emphasis added)). See also Floyd v. Western Surgical Associates, 773 
P.2d 401, 404 (Utah App. 1989) (where the patient can make a connection between 
his surgery and his subsequent symptoms, he discovered or should have discovered 
formerly numbered § 78-14-4(1). Because the language is identical, we cite 
to the current version of the statute. 
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his injury); Brower v. Brown, 744 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Utah 1987) (Zimmerman, J. 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (where a patient receives an injury which is 
clearly not an expected result of a surgical procedure, that is ccenough, as a matter of 
law, to place her on notice that she had received a legal injury/3 (emphasis added)). 
Under Utah law, accrual of a cause of action is not postponed until the injured 
party has discovered the true nature or full extent of the injury. E.g., Avis v. Board 
of Review of Industrial Commission, 837 P.2d 584, 588 (Utah App. 1992) 
(rejecting plaintiffs argument that the statute did not begin to run until he 
"discovered the full extent of his injury.55) CC[A] cause of action accrues when a 
plaintiff could have first filed and prosecuted an action to successful completion.55 
DOIT. Inc. v. Touche. Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835, 843 (Utah 1996) (citations 
omitted). "Once a claim accrues, it may not be maintained unless it is commenced 
within the limitations period prescribed by the applicable statute of limitations.55 Id2 
Neither is the accrual of a legal injury postponed while a patient investigates 
who is responsible for the medical injury. McDougal v. Weed, 945 P.2d 175, 177 
(Utah App. 1997). In McDougal, the plaintiff named the wrong physician in his 
statutory notice of intent, pursuing the matter through the prelitigation process. 
Subsequentiy, before the trial court and on appeal, he argued that he "did not 
discover, nor could have discovered through reasonable diligence, the identity of the 
2Mr. Roth has never explained how Dr. Pedersen5s failure to discuss a problem 
of fading ink could constitute fraudulent concealment when he knew he had oeen 
injured because the tattooed portion of his colon had not been removed and that 
both Dr. Voorhees and Dr. Pedersen were involved in the failed search for the 
tattoos during the surgery. Moreover, once the patient knows of his injury and his 
cause of action accrues, subsequent concealment, whether fraudulent or not, is 
legally immaterial. While the statutory discovery rule tolls pending discovery, it does 
not stop the running of the limitations period where the action has already accrued. 
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proper party defendant55 until informed of the identity by the prelitigation panel after 
the statute had run. McDougal at 177. This Court disagreed, concluding that, 
under the statutory language, the action accrued upon discovery of the injury, not 
the party responsible for the injury. 
The statutory language clearly sets the moment the "patient 
discovers . . . the injury53 as tne triggering moment for the 
limitations period. Thus, the only triggering moment 
contemplated under the statute is the moment of discovery of the 
legal injury. The discovery of an injury and that the injury was 
possibly the result of medical malpractice are facts distinct from 
discovery of the identity of a defendant. Accordingly, an injured 
person need not determine the identity of the person responsible 
for his or her injury to determine that he or she has been injured 
and that the injury was possibly tied to negligence. Thus, we 
conclude that the statutory discovery rule aoes not require that 
the statute of limitations be tolled until the identity or the 
tortfeasor is discovered or should have been discovered after a 
reasonably diligent effort to ascertain it. 
McDougal at 177. 
McDougal is controlling. Mr. Roth knew he had suffered a legal injury by 
October 13, 2004. That is why he sued Dr. Voorhees. Mr. Roth also knew of 
Dr. Pedersen5s participation in the surgery in May of 2004. He knew the facts 
necessary to begin an action against Dr. Pedersen when he initiated his claim against 
Dr. Voorhees. In fact, Mr. Roth5s notice of claim against Dr. Voorhees specifically 
references Dr. Pedersen's involvement. The injury that caused the claim to accrue 
against Dr. Voorhees was also the injury that caused the claim to accrue against 
Dr. Pedersen.3 There was nothing that legally prevented Mr. Roth from instituting 
3Mr. Roth is not alleging a different injury was caused by Dr. Pedersen only 
that the injury was the responsibility of a different physician than the one he first 
sued. 
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legal action against Dr. Pedersen when he initiated the litigation against 
Dr. Voorhees. 
Mr. Roth's argument that he did not know he had a claim against 
Dr. Pedersen until after Dr. Voorhees' deposition was taken is of no avail. Lack of 
knowledge of whom among several known potential tortfeasors is at fault does not 
toll the running of the limitations period. Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds. Inc., 
920 P.2d 575, 578 (Utah App. 1996) ("simple ignorance of or obliviousness to the 
existence of a cause of action will not prevent the running of the statute of 
limitations.5') Mr. Roth failed to name as a defendant a physician who consulted in 
the surgery that caused his injury. In doing so he took the risk that he may have 
sued the wrong defendant or that the defendant he did sue might seek to blame the 
consulting physician. The fact that Mr. Roth failed in his suit against Dr. Voorhees 
does not prevent the running of the statute of limitations against Dr. Pedersen. 
The facts of this case are analogous to those in McDougal, where the plaintiff 
was in discovery with the wrong party when he discovered the identity of the proper 
defendant based upon the testimony of the defendant he had named. Here, 
Mr. Roth was in discovery in his claim against Dr. Voorhees when he "discovered" 
evidence of a problem of fading ink, which the failure to disclose is now claimed to 
be negligence on the part of Dr. Pedersen. He could have named Dr. Pedersen from 
the outset, but did not.4 
4We note also that Mr. Roth made no attempt to amend his complaint against 
Dr. Voorhees to include Dr. Pedersen as a defendant. Instead, he ignored the 
information he possessed and decided after the fact to commence litigation 
separately against Dr. Pedersen. 
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III. THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO PROPERLY ALLEGE A CLAIM OF 
FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT FROM MR. ROTH BY 
DR. PEDERSEN AND WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED. 
The substance of Mr. Roth's fraudulent concealment claim consists of a single 
paragraph: 
Upon information and testimony provided to Plaintiff within the 
year it appears that Dr. Pedersen concealed the fact that he failed 
to properly consult with Dr. Voorhees in May 2004 as to the 
reasons the tattooing may not have been identified, the reasons 
the polypectomy site could not be seen and the area requiring 
surgery remained. , 
(Complaint 1f 39, R. 6 (emphasis added).) Nowhere in his Complaint does 
Mr. Roth allege that Dr. Pedersen failed to speak with him or that he concealed any 
information from him. The sole allegation of his Complaint references only what 
Mr. Roth thinks Dr. Pedersen should have told Dr. Voorhees. 
Additionally, where fraudulent concealment is alleged, the circumstances 
forming the basis for the allegation must be stated with particularity. Rule 9(b), 
Utah R.Civ.P. To avoid this requirement, Mr. Roth argues that his Complaint 
should be liberally construed in his favor. The rule of liberal construction, however, 
does not apply to allegations of fraudulent conduct which must be pled with 
particularity under Rule 9. DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 443 (Utah 1995). Mr. 
Roth states only that ccit appears5' that Dr. Pedersen concealed information from Dr. 
Voorhees, an allegation that falls well short of pleading with particularity.5 
5We note that pleading fraud based on information and belief may satisfy Rule 
9, but only ccas long as it includes the facts upon which the belief is based." Kuhre v. 
Good fellow, 2003 UT App 85,11 24, 69 P.3d 286, 292 (citation omitted). There 
are no such facts included in Mr. Roth's Complaint. 
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Moreover, nothing in the Complaint alleges that Dr. Pedersen acted 
affirmatively to fraudulently conceal a cause of action against Mr. Roth, a 
requirement clearly delineated by the Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act: 
[I]n an action where it is alleged that a patient has been 
prevented from discovering misconduct on the part of a health 
care provider because that nealth care provider has affirmatively 
acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct, the claim 
shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the 
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable 
diligence, should have discovered the fraudulent concealment, 
whichever first occurs. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-404(2)(b) (emphasis added). A plaintiff, to avail himself 
of the tolling provision, must adequately plead at least two elements: (1) that the 
health care provider acted affirmatively and (2) that the provider fraudulendy 
concealed his/her misconduct. Mr. Roth's Complaint fails on both counts. 
Moreover, Mr. Roth has failed to allege that he used any reasonable diligence in 
discovering the alleged fraud or that the nondisclosure would have reasonably made 
a difference in any decision he made. 
Mr. Roth also seeks to avoid the requirements to plead affirmative acts of 
fraudulent concealment by arguing that Dr. Pedersen had a "fiduciary duty35 to 
disclose to him that he failed to disclose material information to Dr. Voorhees. This 
Court in McDougal v. Weed, 945 P.2d 175 (Utah App. 1997) reviewed the 
elements of fraudulent concealment and concluded that mere silence is insufficient to 
form the basis of a claim. "The party's silence must amount to fraud, i.e., silence 
under the circumstances must amount to an affirmation that a state of things exists 
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which does not exist6, and the uninformed party must be deprived to the same extent 
as if a positive assertion has been made.55 McDougal at 179. 
Dr. Pedersen's alleged failure to Dr. Voorhees5 advise on the issue of fading 
ink is not the equivalent of "positive assertion.55 There was no affirmative act of 
concealment, much less "fraudulent55 concealment by Dr. Pedersen. He didn't speak 
with Mr. Roth after the surgery because Dr. Voorhees, the surgeon, did. There is 
no allegation that Mr. Roth or anyone on his behalf ever spoke with Dr. Pedersen 
about the surgery. Dr. Pedersen had no subsequent involvement with Mr. Roth and 
had no reason to speak with him or anyone else about the surgery. As far as he knew 
the surgery had been a success. These circumstances simply fail to satisfy the 
requirements of an affirmative act to fraudulently conceal which would toll the 
limitations period. I 
Mr. Roth5s reliance on Russell Packard Development, Inc. v. Carson, 2005 
UT 14, 108 P. 3d 741 is misplaced. Russell Packard dealt with an element of the 
equitable discovery rule that doesn5t apply where a statute provides a discovery rule. 
As recognized by this Court, cc[t]he equitable discovery rule applies only where a 
statute of limitations does not, by its own terms, already account for such 
circumstances - ix^ where a statute of limitations lacks a discovery rule.55 Moore v. 
Smith, 2007 UT App 101,11 26, 158 P.3d 562, 571 (punctuation omitted, citing 
Russell Packard 11 25 at 747). 
6One wonders how the question of fading ink could after the existence of 
tattoos that were subsequently seen by Dr. Joseph, Dr. Willis, Dr. Bart and Dr. 
Sklow. 
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Nowhere in the Complaint did Mr. Roth allege that Dr. Pedersen had a duty 
to tell him the information he allegedly didn't convey to Dr. Voorhees.7 While the 
alleged duty was discussed in memoranda, the issue here isn't whether a plaintiff can 
cure a defect in a complaint by creative legal argument in a memorandum. Looking 
solely at the face of the complaint, it is apparent that no claim for fraudulent 
concealment has been adequately alleged. 
Moreover, it is impossible for Plaintiff to resolve Dr. Pedersen's failure to 
disclose a fading ink problem with facts that make fading ink irrelevant and 
immaterial, i.e.^ that subsequent observers saw the tattoos. How could Dr. 
Pedersen's failure to discuss with Dr. Voorhees, Dr. Joseph's alleged problems with 
fading ink constitute concealment of a material fact when the tattoos were 
subsequently seen? 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly considered matters established by the pleadings and 
did not rely on material outside of them. The Complaint, as supplemented by the 
Answer, clearly establishes that Mr. Roth knew or should have known of his legal 
injury on October 13, 2004. Indeed, the Complaint alone is sufficient to establish 
this fact. At the time his cause of action accrued against Dr. Voorhees it also accrued 
against Dr. Pedersen. 
7One of the many inconsistencies with Mr. Roth's argument is his fact 
statement that Dr. Voorhees "discussed in June 2004 with Dr. Joseph his concern of 
not being informed prior to the surgery he performed on Roth that Dr. Joseph had 
experienced problems such as fading or the c>POT tattoos. If Dr. Pedersen didn't 
mention the ink fading problem, how did Dr. Voorhees know to discuss it with Dr. 
Joseph? 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this $_ day of June, 2009. 
XIAMS & HUNT 
A 
f//lA. hM 
DENNIS C. FERGUSON 
Attorneys for Defendant/i^ppeilee 
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